The
Defendant,
W. Fred Koschara, moves that this charge be
dismissed, that the finding of Habitual Offender lodged against the Defendant
by the Department of Safety be vacated, and that the provisions of
RSA 259:39 and
RSA 263:1 be declared null
and void, on the grounds that:
- The State has attempted to deprive the Defendant
of his Inalienable Rights through an assignment of
Habitual Offender status without Due Process of Law;
- The officials within the Department of Safety used
unconstitutional and fraudulent allegations as
their grounds for finding the Defendant to be a Habitual Offender;
- The statutory definition of the term Habitual
Offender is itself unconstitutional;
- The alleged requirement for anyone driving on the public roads
in the State to carry a license to do so is a
Constructive Fraud that further attempts to deprive the
populace of their Inalienable Rights.
Arguments
I. Deprivation of Inalienable Rights without Due Process of Law
The Defendant contends that the State has attempted to deprive the Defendant
of his Inalienable Rights without Due Process of Law on the basis that the
Director of Motor Vehicles and his
Subordinates, being members
of the
Executive branch of the government, have
usurped the
authority of the
Judicial branch by passing judgment; and that,
further, they are
abusing their governmental authority in attempting
to prevent the Defendant from exercising his inalienable rights by means of
their wrongful judgment.
Article
72-a of the
New Hampshire
State Constitution describes the
Judiciary Power for the
state:
[Supreme and Superior Courts.] The judicial power of the state
shall be vested in the supreme court, a trial court of general
jurisdiction known as the superior court, and such lower courts as the
legislature may establish under Article 4th of
Part 2.
According to
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary,
published by Merriam-Webster, Inc. and copyright 1988,
"
judicial" and "
executive" are defined as
follows:
judicial - 1 a: of or relating to a judgment, the function
of judging, the administration of justice, or the judiciary b
belonging to the branch of government that is charged with trying all
cases that involve the government and with the administration of justice
within its jurisdiction
executive - 2 a: of or relating to the execution of the
laws and the conduct of public and national affairs b: belonging
to the branch of government that is charged with such powers as
diplomatic representation, superintendence of the execution of the laws,
and appointment of officials and that usu[ally] has some power over
legislation (as through veto)
The Director of Motor Vehicles, and his subordinates, in passing judgment of
anyone on the basis of their driving record, have blatantly
overstepped the bounds of their authority as defined by the
New Hampshire
State Constitution, which provides that the
judicial power in the
state belongs in the
courts, not the
executive branch of the
government. Since their act of judging the Defendant to be a Habitual
Offender was effected without a trial, lacking the Due Process of Law
required for such a proceeding, it is therefore unconstitutional, and the
Defendant requests that the case be dismissed as
Unconstitutional under
the New
Hampshire State Constitution.
II. Unconstitutional and Fraudulent Allegations as Grounds for Finding
There are two things a person comes into this world with that they can claim
as being intrinsically their own - the goods they have to trade with the
world around them for every thing else they want or need to sustain their
life. The two things are
Time and
Ability. Any
entity - whether a person or an organization (such as a government) that
seeks to deprive a person of either their time or their ability, without just
cause, is attempting to commit a crime against that person.
The speed limit laws enforced in this country directly deprive motorists of
both their time and their ability, then further demand the
"offender" pay fines and increased insurance rates, and potentially subject
them to other, more destructive burdens - including the possibility of
incarceration - simply because they tried to make the best use of their time
that they could.
It is NOT a valid argument to say that these actions are necessary to
prevent accidents: Such an action would be a case of prior restraint.
In numerous cases, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that
prior restraint is unconstitutional: The government cannot restrain a
person from doing something that might be illegal, but can only act after the
fact. Prior restraint is also unjustifiable when examined logically: Why
should a person be punished for the possibility they
might commit a crime? If that is going to be done, we should
outlaw the use of silverware - because a diner might pick up a
fork and stab their neighbor. Further, we should also outlaw chairs, because
someone might pick one up and club another person with one.
For that matter, we should just outlaw civilization and get it done
with, because without social intercourse, there would be no danger of human
interaction - which is the only time crimes are committed by one person
against another.
Another argument that has been used to justify the speed enforcement is
statistical observation has shown speeding drivers are more likely to
have accidents than ones traveling at more sedate paces. This is
FRAUD. Any competent mathematician will testify that statistics
is a branch of mathematics useful for observing and characterizing the
past behavior of large groups; it is totally useless for
predicting the future behavior of an individual - which is exactly
what is being done in this case.
When motorists are subjected to speed enforcement because of statistical
observations, they are being punished for crimes committed by other drivers -
not their own. This is a perversion of justice, and cannot be
allowed to stand.
The Fourth
Amendment to the United States
Constitution states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The New Hampshire Revised Statutes, Annotated, Title 21, Chapter 265, Section
4 (commonly known as
RSA
265:4) decrees:
Disobeying an Officer.
- No person, while driving or in charge of a vehicle, shall:
- Refuse, when requested by a law enforcement officer, to give
his name, address, date of birth, and the name and address of
the owner of such vehicle;
- Give a false name, date of birth, address, name and address
of the owner of such vehicle, or any other false information
to a law enforcement officer that would hinder the law
enforcement officer from properly identifying the person in
charge of such motor vehicle;
- Purposely neglect to stop when signaled to stop by any law
enforcement officer who is in uniform or who displays his
badge conspicuously on the outside of his outer coat or
garment, or who signals such person to stop by means of any
authorized audible or visual emergency warning signals; or
otherwise willfully attempt to elude pursuit by a law
enforcement officer by increasing speed, extinguishing
headlamps while still in motion or abandoning a vehicle while
being pursued;
- Refuse, on demand of such officer, to sign his name in the
presence of such officer;
- Refuse, on demand of such officer, to produce his license to
drive such vehicle or his certificate of registration or to
permit such officer to take the license or certificate in
hand for the purpose of examination;
- Refuse or neglect to produce his license when requested by a
court or justice, or refuse to surrender to the director or
to any authorized employee of the department or other
authorized representative of the director any license,
registration certificate or number plate upon demand after
suspension or revocation of the same.
- II. Any person who violates the provisions of paragraph I of
this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and may have his
license or privilege to drive and any registrations issued in his
name suspended. If any person other than the driver of the
pursued vehicle sustains personal injury in a collision resulting
from the driving of a vehicle which is evading pursuit by a law
enforcement officer, the driver of such pursued vehicle shall be
guilty of a class B felony.
Since paragraphs
(a),
(c),
(d), and
(e) appear to
allow a law enforcement officer to demand unwarranted access to a person,
their papers, and their possessions at whim, and without cause, these
sections of
RSA 265:4 are
a unconstitutional under the
United States
Constitution.
According to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, (as
previously referenced), "misdemeanor" is defined as:
misdemeanor - 1 : a crime less serious than a felony
The
Sixth
Amendment to the
United States
Constitution states that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
In addition,
Article
15 of the
New Hampshire
State Constitution provides:
[Right of Accused.] No subject shall be held to answer for any
crime, or offense, until the same is fully and plainly, substantially and
formally, described to him; or be compelled to accuse or furnish evidence
against himself. Every subject shall have a right to produce all proofs
that may be favorable to himself; to meet the witnesses against him face
to face, and to be fully heard in his defense, by himself, and counsel.
No subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his
property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the
law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the
judgment of his peers, or the law of the land; provided that, in any
proceeding to commit a person acquitted of a criminal charge by reason of
insanity, due process shall require that clear and convincing evidence
that the person is potentially dangerous to himself or to others and that
the person suffers from a mental disorder must be established. Every
person held to answer in any crime or offense punishable by deprivation
of liberty shall have the right to counsel at the expense of the state if
need is shown; this right he is at liberty to waive, but only after the
matter has been thoroughly explained by the court.
The Defendant recorded the following in
his
notes on
January 28, 1998, starting at 4:15AM, following a
trial in Salem District Court:
Sitting in court, listening to the process, I could see I had a "hanging"
judge in front of me: No matter what evidence or argument *anyone* put up
in their defense, they *all* were found guilty and a sentence imposed.
All of the court cases were done before they called me, except that the
prisoners were being brought in from the station, according to comments
made by the court staff.
The clerk called for "William Koschara" as I expected they would, and I
got up saying I didn't think it was appropriate for them to be calling my
father in their court. After I'd made it clear I thought their attempts
to rename me were wrong, the judge asked the prosecuting attorney if the
state was ready to proceed, and she said they were. As the first officer
that had stopped me started to the stand, I interrupted to say I wanted
to know if there were charges against me in the court, and if so, I
wanted to know what they were. That slowed them down a bit, and I was
finally presented with tickets citing the charges against me. The judge
didn't want to wait, but said I could sit down and read the tickets and
they'd call me back to the stand.
After clearing a couple of the other people from the room (I guess there
might actually have been two or three people that were still waiting when
I was first called), they brought me back up. I said that since I hadn't
been informed of the charges against me prior to that time, I had not
been able to adequately prepare my defense, and asked for some time to do
so. The judge said I should have asked, and the prosecutor said I should
have called their office, and the judge announced they were going ahead
anyway. This, I was prevented from obtaining the services of an
attorney, even if I wanted to.
Since it was quite clear this court was intending to railroad a
conviction through, no matter what I said or did - unless I gave the
judge a chance to lock me up for "contempt" as he would probably liked to
have done - I decided to sit down and let them have their farce.
The woman cop - Ms. June Frechette (as indicated by the tickets I
received) - presented her story, which, for the most part, was fairly
accurate. Two points of misinformation stand out: She said she was
following "several" cars when she turned to follow me when she left her
position in front of the dog track - where I was the only car on that
part of the road, and she said I had first started to allow them to put
me in handcuffs, then pushed away in an attempt to resist. The other
cop, Officer Decker, or Becker (I don't recall his name exactly, and I
wasn't given any papers with it on it), said he had been traveling south
on Route 28 when he fell in with the other officer to follow me. (I
think a transcript of the radio broadcasts for the night would probably
reveal that to be an inaccurate statement - made under oath). He also
said I put up my hands to prevent them from being restrained with their
handcuffs, and that he had to throw me against the car so Ms. Frechette
could put the cuffs on. He also said I had told him that everybody had
to call me "the wizard" when he was putting me in the patrol car - which
is a _complete_ fabrication: The only way "wizard" had come up in
relation to me that evening is the business card I pulled out of my
pocket and handed them in the police station happened to be one that has
my name, phone number, and the title "Wizard" on it. At _no time_ during
the course of the incident did I ask them, or anyone else, to address me
as, or call me "wizard."
Once this officer got done making his statement, I asked, in cross
examining him, when it was that I had said I should be called "wizard" -
and he again said it was when he was putting me in the patrol car. I
asked him if he intended to stick to that statement, under oath, and if
he would be willing to subject himself to a polygraph test of his
testimony. The prosecutor announced "objection" and the judge said
"sustained" (I'd like to know *what* the objection is - which they never
stated - I should have asked at the time), so I said if the witness is
going to be allowed to lie on the stand, there's nothing more I have to
ask him.
I was then allowed to take the stand. I said I had gone home that night,
and sat down at my computer to take notes about the incident, and I would
be reading from those notes. I summarized the first few lines by saying
I had intended to go to Applebee's that night, but had ended up at the
Grand China to meet a friend. I then started reading, starting with the
2:37 entry. After I'd read about
2 1/2 pages of my notes, the judge interrupted me, saying I'd gone beyond
the case at hand in reading my narrative, and asked if I wanted to say
anything about my driving after suspension, which I hadn't said anything
about in the notes. I thought about it for a moment, then said I didn't
have anything to say, so he asked me to step down from the witness stand.
Once I got back to the "defense" table, he said that based on the
evidence and hearing the testimony, he was finding me guilty of
disobeying a police officer, $100 fine with a $20 penalty assessment,
guilty of driving after suspension, $100 fine with a $20 penalty
assessment, and guilty of resisting arrest, with the sentence suspended.
I was then dismissed to wait for the clerk's office to call me to collect
their money.
The
entire proceedings at the trial described above are
unconstitutional, not only under the
United States
Constitution, but the
New Hampshire
State Constitution as well, for the following reasons:
- A misdemeanor is a crime, and the defendant in a criminal proceeding
is entitled to a jury trial by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
- The Defendant was not provided with any documents explaining the
charges against him prior to his appearance in court when the trial
was held, contrary to the Sixth
Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article
15 of the New
Hampshire State Constitution.
- The judge refused to allow the Defendant opportunity to obtain or
discuss the case with counsel, once again in violation of both
the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Article
15 of the N.H.
State Constitution.
- The judge refused to allow the Defendant to present his entire
defense, again violating Article
15 of the New
Hampshire State Constitution.
Since
any unconstitutional act does not hold the authority of
law, the Defendant is
not obligated to pay the fines imposed
as a result of this trial. In addition,
any subsequent actions
taken by the government on the basis of the convictions decreed are
without constitutional grounds, and therefore
without
authority of law.
Attached to this Motion For Dismissal is an
annotated copy of the six (6) page Driver Record Report the Department of
Safety used in its hearing to determine the Defendant is a Habitual Offender.
As can be seen by examining the Record, Items (5), (6),
(7), (8), (9), (11), (12), (13),
(14), (15), (18), and (20) are due to nothing
more than the Defendant driving over the posted speed limits - no accidents
are involved, no injuries, property damage or deaths occurred. In a word,
the Defendant was simply attempting to make the best use of his time and
ability, and nothing in his actions could be punished except through an
unconstitutional application of prior restraint. In addition, the
suspensions indicated by items (3), (4), (10),
(17), and (21) are direct consequences of those speeding
convictions, as is the Operating After Suspension conviction indicated at
Item (16), and would not be present without said unconstitutional
applications of prior restraint. Further, the conviction for
Disobeying a Police Officer at Item (1) is the result of a clearly
unconstitutional trial, and therefore without authority of law, and
the subsequent suspension at Item (2) that resulted when the Defendant
refused to pay the fine the court levied is also without legal grounds. With
those items removed from the Record, all that would be left on the
Defendant's driving record are the No Inspection violations at Items
(19) and (22) which are definitely not sufficient
grounds for making a determination of Habitual Offender. Since there are no
grounds that are not unconstitutional and/or fraudulent for determining the
Defendant is a Habitual Offender, the Defendant not only moves that this case
be dismissed for lack of merit, but also to have the
Habitual Offender status vacated by order of the Court.
III. Statutory Definition Of Habitual Offender Is Unconstitutional
Article
18 of the
New Hampshire
State Constitution provides that:
[Penalties to be Proportioned to Offenses; True Design of
Punishment.] All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of
the offense. No wise legislature will affix the same punishment to the
crimes of theft, forgery, and the like, which they do to those of murder
and treason. Where the same undistinguishing severity is exerted against
all offenses, the people are led to forget the real distinction in the
crimes themselves, and to commit the most flagrant with as little
compunction as they do the lightest offenses. For the same reason a
multitude of sanguinary laws is both impolitic and unjust. The true
design of all punishments being to reform, not to exterminate mankind.
The New Hampshire Revised Statutes, Annotated, Title 21, Chapter 259, Section
39 (
RSA 259:39)
states:
Habitual Offender - "Habitual offender" means any resident or
nonresident person whose record, as maintained in the office of the
division, shows that such person has accumulated convictions in the
number provided in paragraph I, II or III of this section for those
offenses listed therein and committed within a 5-year period, based on
the date of the offense. After a conviction for an offense listed either
in paragraph I or in paragraph II and during the 5-year period, if a
subsequent single incident results in convictions for more than one
offense under the same paragraph, each such conviction may be counted
separately for the purpose of certifying a person as an habitual
offender. A person who meets the requirements of one of the following 3
paragraphs shall be certified as an habitual offender:
- Three or more convictions, singularly or in combination, of the
following offenses:
- Conviction of any offense specified in RSA 261:73;
- Conviction of any offense specified in RSA 262:1, I;
- Conviction of any offense specified in RSA 262:8;
- Conviction of any offense specified in RSA 262:12;
- Conviction of any offense specified in RSA 262:13;
- Conviction of any offense specified in RSA 263:12,
V;
- Conviction of any offense specified in RSA 263:64;
- Conviction of any offense specified in RSA 264:25;
- Conviction of any offense specified in RSA 265:4;
- Conviction of any offense specified in RSA 265:79;
- Conviction of any offense specified in RSA 265:82;
- Conviction of any offense specified in RSA
265:82-a;
- Conviction under RSA 630:2 of
manslaughter resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle;
- Conviction under RSA 630:3 of
negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor
vehicle;
- Conviction of any felony in which a motor vehicle is used;
- Conviction of any offense specified in RSA 265:75.
- Twelve or more convictions, singularly or in combination, of the
following offenses:
- Conviction of any offense specified in 265-22.htm">RSA
265:22.
- Conviction of any offense specified in 265-60.htm">RSA
265:60.
- Conviction of any offense specified in RSA 263:1.
- Conviction of any offense specified in 263-63.htm">RSA
263:63.
- A combination of one conviction of an offense specified under
paragraph I and at least 8 convictions, singularly or in
combination, of offenses specified under paragraph II; or a
combination of 2 convictions, singularly or in combination, of
offenses specified under paragraph I and at least 4 convictions,
singularly or in combination, of offenses specified under
paragraph II.
As written, this definition equates, for example, the following offenses to
manslaughter or
negligent homicide resulting from the operation of
a motor vehicle: making a false statement relative to the payment of a
resident tax (
RSA
261:73); possession of master keys (
RSA 262:13), lending a
driver's license or permit to another person (
RSA 263:12), four
speeding convictions, whether any accidents were involved or not (
RSA 265:60), and
refusing to sign their name at the demand of an officer (
RSA 265:4).
It is the sincere belief of the Defendant that this equation by law of
"the lightest offenses" with "the most
flagrant" is a dangerous violation of Article
18 of the New Hampshire
State Constitution. The Defendant therefore moves that RSA 259:39, the
definition of Habitual Offender, be found unconstitutional, and
therefore null and void, at least until it has been rewritten by the
Legislature.
IV. Alleged License Requirement Is a Constructive Fraud
Referring once again to
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary, (as previously referenced), "
license" is
defined as:
license - 1 a: permission to act b: freedom of
action 2 a: a permission granted by competent authority to engage
in a business or occupation or in an activity that would otherwise be
unlawful b: a document, plate, or tag evidencing a license granted
Article
2 of the
New Hampshire
State Constitution states that:
[Natural Rights.] All men have certain natural, essential, and
inherent rights - among which are, the enjoying and defending life and
liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting, property; and, in a word,
of seeking and obtaining happiness. Equality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged by this state on account of race, creed,
color, sex or national origin.
Article
3 goes on to say that:
[Society, its Organization and Purposes.] When men enter into a
state of society, they surrender up some of their natural rights to that
society, in order to ensure the protection of others; and, without such
an equivalent, the surrender is void.
Clearly, the authors of the
State
Constitution had in mind the same "certain unalienable Rights
... Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness" that were described in
the
Declaration of Independence signed by the Second Continental
Congress on July 4, 1776. In addition, they recognized that, while it is
necessary for us to surrender some of our natural rights in order for human
society to function, such a surrender is only valid if an equivalent benefit
is received from society in return.
If ever a judge understood the public's right to use the public roads, it was
Justice Tolman of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. Justice
Tolman stated:
"Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a
blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll
roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the
highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the
people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their
liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid
encroachment." Robertson vs. Department of Public Works,
180 Wash 133, 147.
The words of Justice Tolman ring most prophetically in the ears of Citizens
throughout the country today as the use of the public roads has been
monopolized by the very entity which has been empowered to stand guard over
our freedoms, i.e., that of state government.
The "most sacred of liberties" of which Justice Tolman spoke was personal
liberty. The definition of personal liberty is:
"Personal liberty, or the Right to enjoyment of life and liberty, is one
of the fundamental or natural Rights, which has been protected by its
inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not
derived from, or dependent on, the U.S.
Constitution, which may not be submitted to a vote and may not depend
on the outcome of an election. It is one of the most sacred and
valuable Rights, as sacred as the Right to private property...and is
regarded as inalienable." 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law,
Sect.202, p.987.
and further...
"Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to go
where and when one pleases -- only so far restrained as the Rights of
others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The
Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport
his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or
automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted
or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this
Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions,
travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places,
and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither
interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected,
not only in his person, but in his safe conduct." [emphasis added]
II Am.Jur. (1st) Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p.1135.
"Personal liberty -- consists of the power of locomotion, of changing
situations, of removing one's person to whatever place one's inclination
may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due process of
law." 1 Blackstone's Commentary 134; Hare, Constitution__.777;
Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.
Justice Tolman was concerned about the State prohibiting the Citizen from the
"most sacred of his liberties," the Right of movement, the Right of moving
one's self from place to place without threat of imprisonment, the Right to
use the public roads in the ordinary course of life.
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no
rule making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda
vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491.
and...
"The claim and exercise of a constitutional Right cannot be converted
into a crime." Miller vs. U.S., 230 F. 486, 489.
and...
"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this
exercise of constitutional Rights." Snerer vs. Cullen, 481
F. 946.
Streets and highways are established and maintained for the purpose of travel
and transportation by the public. Such travel may be for business or
pleasure.
"The use of the highways for the purpose of travel and transportation is
not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental Right of which
the public and the individual cannot be rightfully deprived."
[emphasis added] Chicago Motor Coach vs. Chicago, 169 NE 22;
Ligare vs. Chicago, 28 NE 934; Boon vs. Clark, 214 SSW
607; 25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways Sect.163.
and...
"The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to
transport his property thereon, either by horse drawn carriage or by
automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city can prohibit or
permit at will, but a common Right which he has under the right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." [emphasis added]
Thompson vs. Smith, 154 SE 579.
Therefore, it is concluded that a citizen does have a "Right" to travel and
transport his property upon the public highways and roads and the exercise of
this Right is not a "privilege." In order for the definition of
license to apply, the State would have to take up the position that
the exercise of a Constitutional Right to use the public roads in the
ordinary course of life and business is illegal, a trespass, or a tort, which
the State could then regulate or prevent. This position, however, would
raise magnitudinous Constitutional questions as this position would be
diametrically opposed to fundamental Constitutional Law.
The New Hampshire Revised Statutes, Annotated, Title 21, Chapter 263, Section
1 (RSA 263:1)
states:
License Required. - No person, except those expressly exempted
under RSA 263:25 or
other provisions of this title, shall drive any motor vehicle upon any
way in this state unless such person has a valid driver's license, as
required under the provisions of this chapter, for the class or type of
vehicle being driven. Except as otherwise herein provided, any person
who drives a motor vehicle in this state without having a valid driver's
license of the appropriate class or type shall be guilty of a violation,
provided that any person convicted of such offense for the second time in
a 12 month period shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
What "
equivalent benefit" is offered in return for the
populace giving up their
right to travel on the public roads?
According to the annotations for
RSA 263:1, the purpose of
the legislation is "
to protect the public from the acts of
incompetent drivers." While the intent of the law appears at first
glance to be in the best interest of the public, the truth is
possession
of a license to drive does not make a person competent, and requiring all
drivers to carry a state-issued license
at best gives travelers a
false sense of security.
As previously demonstrated, a citizen has the right to travel and to
transport their property on the public highways in the ordinary course of
life and business. However, if one exercises this right to travel the driver
is guilty by statute of a crime. This amounts to the Legislature attempting
the statutory conversion of the exercise of a Constitutional Right into a
crime, which is void on its face. The Defendant therefore moves that RSA 263:1 be declared
unconstitutional, and therefore null and void in perpetuity.
Submitted this nineteenth day of August, 1999 in the Merrimack
District Court of Hillsborough County in the State of New
Hampshire
W. Fred Koschara
Defendant
